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Abstract 
Geoscience research may upset people even though it is ethically acceptable. In this paper we attempt to explore three 
questions about such research. It will turn out that (1) under most circumstances ethical but upsetting geoscience re-
search is morally permissible, (2) revising this research in response to upset-induced external interference is morally im-
permissible in the absence of strong countervailing pragmatic reasons and attempts to reduce upset, and (3) potentially 
upsetting geoscience research ought to be communicated truthfully and tailored to each individual situation. These gen-




eoscience research occasionally upsets 
people. In some instances, this is be-
cause it violates ethical norms. Howev-
er, upset may also be caused by research that is 
perfectly ethically acceptable (abstracting from 
the fact that it upsets people, which may itself 
be ethically relevant). Examples of ethical but 
upsetting geoscience research include hydro-
carbon explorations near populated areas (e.g., 
Vidic et al., 2013), seismological studies that 
indicate the possibility of major earthquakes 
(e.g., Moernaut et al., 2018) and interviews with 
the colleagues of mine workers who died dur-
ing mining activities or strikes (e.g. Alexander 
et al., 2013). 
In this paper we attempt to explore the follow-
ing three questions: (1) Under what conditions, 
if any, is it ethically permissible to conduct eth-
ical but upsetting geoscience research? (2) Un-
der what conditions, if any, is it ethically per-
missible to revise one’s research in response to 
interference by people outside the research 
who are upset by it? (3) How ought one to 
communicate ethical but upsetting research? 
We begin by explaining a case of ethical but 
upsetting geoscience research that led us to 
think about these questions. Referring to this 
case, each of the questions is then explored in 
turn. Our aim is not to develop fully compre-
hensive answers (i.e., to identify every factor 
that is relevant to answering the above ques-
tions with regard to every kind of upsetting 
geoscience research). Rather, we will specify 
several factors that in our view are important 
to the assessment of the particular case with 
which we are concerned. These considerations 
can hopefully serve as a useful starting point 
for assessing and dealing with other cases of 
ethical but upsetting geoscience research as 
well.  
 
2. THE EE-CON PROJECT: AN EXAMPLE OF 
ETHICAL BUT UPSETTING RESEARCH 
 
Both authors of this paper are involved in the 
Austrian Academy of Sciences project Economic 
G 
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and Ethical Consequences of Natural Hazards in 
Alpine Valleys (EE-Con).  
Due to steep topographical relief, high popula-
tion density and the economic importance of 
summer and winter tourism, the Alps and their 
population are particularly vulnerable to geo-
morphological and hydrological hazards. This 
problem might be amplified by rising tempera-
tures and more pronounced precipitation 
events due to climate change. Focusing on two 
alpine valley regions in Austria, the 
Johnsbachtal and the Sölktäler, EE-Con ad-
dresses natural hazards by means of interdisci-
plinary cooperation between geographers, 
economists and philosophers. For example, we 
enquire into the causes, frequency and intensi-
ty of these hazards, as well as residents’ per-
ception and knowledge, the costs of protection 
from and adaptation to the hazards, compensa-
tion for losses, and the potential resettlement of 
(parts of) the valleys (e.g. Ortner et al., 2017).  
There are good reasons for believing that the 
research involved in EE-Con is ethical (not the 
least of which is that the Austrian Academy of 
Sciences approved it). However, the project has 
caused significant upset. Shortly after EE-Con 
started, it was covered by Austria’s largest dai-
ly newspaper. Following reports of past natural 
hazards in one of our study areas, as well as 
the possible impact of climate change, the last 
paragraph of the article addressed the theoreti-
cal option of abandoning parts of these areas. A 
member of the project team was quoted as fol-
lows: “from a purely economic perspective it 
may one day be reasonable to abandon villages 
(which are declining in population anyway). 
But of course, such a decision can never be ex-
clusively grounded in economic considera-
tions” (Kronen Zeitung, 2016).  
This is quite a weak statement. In fact, it only 
states what may be reasonable at some unspeci-
fied point in future if one considers the matter 
from only one relevant perspective. Nevertheless, 
the above-mentioned article significantly upset 
residents of our study areas. Only one day after 
its publication, the mayor of one of the areas 
called the university and threatened to with-
draw his cooperation, which was important for 
the project to be properly accomplished. As he 
explained to us, residents of the valleys simply 
did not want the option of relocation to be ex-
amined in any way. It was, so to speak, a taboo 
issue for them.  
In the days that followed, we prepared for an 
emergency meeting with the mayor and other 
local representatives. This led us to reflect on 
the ethical questions raised in the introduction, 
in particular: was it permissible for us to pur-
sue this project at all? If the mayor requested 
significant revisions to our original research 
plan, to what extent ought we to comply with 
these requests? And how can research such as 
ours be communicated more appropriately? 
 
3. THE PERMISSIBILITY OF CONDUCTING 
ETHICAL BUT UPSETTING RESEARCH 
 
Our first question asks about the conditions 
under which ethical but upsetting geoscience 
research is ethically permissible. At first sight, 
the answer to this question may appear to be 
trivial: if the research at issue is ethical how 
could it ever be ethically impermissible to en-
gage in it? Recall, however, that by “ethical” 
we here mean “ethical, abstracting from the 
fact that the research causes upset”. This means 
that it is possible that the research at issue, 
even though ethical in all other respects, is im-
permissible precisely for the reason that it 
causes upset.   
Since the geoscience research addressed in this 
paper is not unethical in itself, any upset caused 
by this research cannot be a response to it being 
unethical. The upset must rather be caused by 
non-moral facts related to the research (facts 
that make people interpret this research in a 
certain way, facts about people’s specific non-
basic interests, etc.). In our view, this implica-
tion grounds a strong presumption for believ-
ing that ethical but upsetting geoscience re-
search is generally permissible (compare Mill, 
1998 on offence). It is possible for this pre-
sumption to be defeated. In practice, however, 
this will only rarely happen, as it would re-
quire very strong reasons for the research to be 
impermissible, and typically these reasons do 
not hold. 
 
EXPECTED RESEARCH OUTPUT 
One fact that may constitute a strong reason 
against the permissibility of ethical but upset-
ting geoscience research - in our view the most 
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important one - concerns the expected output 
of the research. Suppose experts unequivocally 
agree that a study will not yield any signifi-
cantly valuable output, either in terms of ex-
panding our geoscience knowledge or in terms 
of informing action. Then the fact that this re-
search upsets people may imply that the re-
search ought not to be conducted. After all, it 
seems wrong to upset people for no good rea-
son. 
 
REASONS FOR THE UPSET 
Even though ex hypothesi the research ad-
dressed here cannot upset people because it is 
unethical, there are still good and bad reasons 
for people getting upset. Consider our research 
about relocating communities. While this re-
search may upset one person because he or she 
is genuinely concerned about having to leave 
and thus becoming unable to realize his or her 
life plans (a perfectly understandable reason), 
another person may be equally upset because 
of an insubstantial decrease in a financial in-
vestment that he or she made in the relevant 
area (a worse reason). In our view, upset can 
only possibly constitute a valid for not con-
ducting ethical research to the extent that it is 
based on good reasons. 
 
NUMBER OF UPSET PEOPLE 
Suppose the above two conditions (low ex-
pected scientific value and good reasons for 
upset) are fulfilled. Then one among several 
further relevant factors that determine the 
permissibility of ethical but upsetting geosci-
ence research is the number of people that this 
research upsets. The more people who are up-
set, the stronger one’s reason for not conduct-
ing the research.  
 
DEGREE OF UPSET 
In related terms, the extent to which people are 
upset also matters. The more the geoscience 
research at issue upsets them, the stronger the 
reason not to engage in it.  
 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH BENEFITS 
Finally, assuming that the geoscience research 
at issue is at least somewhat valuable, it also 
matters who will benefit from this research. 
When the upset people themselves are not 
among the recipients of benefits - either direct-
ly or indirectly (for example, by having access 
to additional geoscience knowledge) - it is 
more difficult to justify the research than when 
they are among these recipients. 
In most cases, geoscience research can be ex-
pected to yield valuable results. We according-
ly would like to re-emphasize that the fact that 
a study provokes upset only very rarely im-
plies that this study is impermissible. Such an 
implication does not hold with regard to EE-
Con either. Admittedly, the upset caused by 
this project has to some extent been based on 
good reasons and has been strong. But it only 
affected a small number of people and, most 
importantly, the expected results of our project 
are valuable both in expanding our knowledge 
about natural hazards and in scientifically in-
forming actions regarding the protection and 
potential resettlement of our study areas (thus 
benefitting the very people that the project up-
sets). 
 
4. THE PERMISSIBILITY OF REVISING 
ETHICAL BUT UPSETTING RESEARCH 
 
Let us suppose that an instance of ethical but 
upsetting geoscience research is permissible 
according to the above criteria. Occasionally, 
such as with EE-Con, research of this kind will 
nevertheless upset people to such a high de-
gree that they demand revisions of this re-
search. Our second geoethical question is un-
der what conditions, if any, is it permissible for 
researchers to comply with such demands, i.e., 
to revise their research in response to upset-
induced external influences? 
In answering this question, we assume the val-
ue of the autonomy (or, more broadly, the in-
tegrity) of science. Admittedly, the notion “au-
tonomy of science” is quite vague. There is 
agreement, however, that the value entails that 
science as a social system should be self-
governing. Within the domain of their exper-
tise, and given certain practical limits, those 
who are part of this system should be free from 
external constraints (Resnik, 2008). In our view, 
the importance of the autonomy of science cre-
ates a presumption against revising one’s re-
search in response to external pressure caused 
by people who are upset. This presumption can 
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only be defeated by strong reasons in favor of 
revisions. 
 
PERSISTENCE OF THE UPSET/ 
INTERFERENCE 
For it to become possibly permissible to revise 
one’s research in response to upset-induced in-
terference, one would first have to attempt to 
alleviate this upset. Depending on the details of 
the case one might have for example, to inform 
the media (more clearly) about the aims of this 
research, initiate a public discussion, or sched-
ule a private meeting. Only if serious attempts 
at mediation fail can it possibly become per-
missible to comply with requests for revision.  
 
SCIENTIFIC VALUE OF REVISED RESEARCH 
A further relevant factor in determining the 
permissibility of requested revisions is the na-
ture and extent of these revisions. Sometimes, 
revisions can be implemented without signifi-
cantly decreasing the expected value of the re-
search. However, to the extent that this value is 
threatened, researchers should be much more 
reluctant to give in to external demands.  
 
COSTS OF NON-COMPLIANCE FOR 
RESEARCH 
In some cases, not complying with the upset-
induced request to revise one’s research may 
lead to a complication or partial or complete 
termination of the research. For example, this 
may happen when revisions were requested by 
one’s funding institution or by cooperation 
partners, or when subjects refuse to fill in ques-
tionnaires. Obviously, the higher the risk of 
complications and some degree of termination 
of the project the more permissible is it to make 
concessions to the people who are upset (with-
in ethical boundaries).  
 
COSTS OF NON-COMPLIANCE FOR 
RESEARCHERS 
Finally, non-compliance may also involve seri-
ous costs for the researchers, who may be har-
assed or threatened, may lose the ability to ac-
quire funding for future research, or lose their 
employment. The risk of such costs again ren-
ders it proportionately more permissible to 
conform to the upset people’s requests for revi-
sions (within ethical boundaries).  
Because of the value of the autonomy of sci-
ence, ideally, researchers would resist all upset-
induced external requests for altering their re-
search. However, we acknowledge that in reali-
ty pragmatic considerations may sometimes 
outweigh this value by calling for compromis-
es. In EE-Con, we concluded that, if requested, 
we would go at least some (but not all) way in 
accounting for the mayor’s hypothesized re-
quest not to study the potential resettlement of 
communities. This is because with revisions, 
the part of the project that deals with resettle-
ment would still have delivered valuable re-
sults, and so would the parts that do no deal 
with resettlement. Losing the support of the 
mayor would have involved a high risk of 
complicating aspects of our research and di-
minishing its value.  
 
5. THE COMMUNICATION OF ETHICAL 
BUT UPSETTING RESEARCH 
 
The extent to which potentially upsetting geo-
science research actually upsets people de-
pends significantly on how this research is 
communicated. If it is based on a well-thought-
out communication strategy, such research will 
typically provoke far less upset than if it is 
based on a bad or non-existing strategy (Stew-
art and Lewis, 2017).  
 
INFORMATION CONTENT 
One of the main determinants of whether re-
search will upset people is what one communi-
cates about it. In the case of potentially upset-
ting research, it might be tempting either to not 
inform people and stakeholders about poten-
tially upsetting aspects, to downplay the im-
portance of these aspects, or perhaps even to 
provide false information. But only in very rare 
cases would either of the first two options be 
morally permissible, and the third one certainly 
is not (see Charlton 2009; Di Capua et al. 2017). 
To begin with, truth is an intrinsic value that is 
of primary importance within science. Second-
ly, scientists have a social responsibility to ade-
quately report their research to the public (es-
pecially when they are publicly funded). Third-
ly, omissions, trivializations and lies may have 
all sorts of bad consequences, ranging from 
lawsuits and public distrust (in specific projects 
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and in science in general) to harm to one’s aca-
demic reputation.  
 
CLARITY OF INFORMATION 
While potentially upsetting research must gen-
erally be communicated truthfully, there are 
more and less appropriate ways of doing so. In 
many cases information about research upsets 
people because they misunderstand it. It is thus 
important that researchers state objectives, 
methods, results, uncertainties, and probabili-
ties as clearly and intelligibly as possible. In 
particular, they should minimize both ambigui-
ty (the existence of multiple meanings), vague-
ness (the existence of borderline cases in mean-
ing) and the complexity of their explanations.  
 
TYPE OF COMMUNICATION 
Bultitude (2010) distinguishes three ways of 
communicating scientific research: traditional 
journalism (e.g., newspapers, radio and televi-
sion), live or face-to-face events (e.g., public 
debates and lectures), and online interactions 
(e.g., websites and blogs). Each of these types 
has advantages and disadvantages. For exam-
ple, while traditional journalism reaches large 
audiences and is generally perceived as trust-
worthy, it typically does not allow scientists to 
report their research in detail, does not give 
them much control over how it is presented, 
and prevents audiences from responding by 
comments or questions (Bultitude 2010; see al-
so Foresta Martin and Peppoloni 2017). The 
appropriateness of researchers’ communication 
strategies also significantly depends on how 
they choose the type of communication that 
best fits their respective situation.  
 
TIMING OF COMMUNICATION 
Suppose a person were informed that starting 
tomorrow, geologists will perform hydrocar-
bon explorations in the vicinity of his or her 
property. No doubt the person would become 
terribly upset - and rightly so. By not informing 
the person earlier, the researchers engaged in 
this project would have prevented him or her 
from gathering more information, publicly ob-
jecting to the explorations, coming to terms 
with the project, etc. Hence, the timing of the 
communication of potentially upsetting re-
search matters as well. In particular, such re-
search ought to be communicated as early as 
possible. 
 
RECIPIENTS OF INFORMATION 
Finally, the way in which potentially upsetting 
research is communicated must also be tailored 
to the recipients of the information. A fact sheet 
for experts of the Department of Agriculture, 
for example, requires a substantially different 
content and form (in terms of comprehensive-
ness, complexity, etc.) than does a fact sheet for 
the local population (Alexander, 2007; Marone 
et al., 2015; Stewart and Lewis, 2017).  
 
These considerations suggest that developing 
an appropriate strategy for communicating po-
tentially upsetting research is complex and 
highly dependent on its context. In retrospect, 
it seems that in the EE-Con project, we did not 
pay sufficient attention to this task. There 
probably would have been no need for us to 
address the resettlement aspect of our research 
in the newspaper interview mentioned above, 
as this is only one of several aspects of our pro-
ject and the article did not aim for comprehen-
siveness. Rather, in communicating this aspect, 
we should have employed selective, live or 
face-to-face types of communication, and we 





In this paper, we have arrived at three conclu-
sions about ethical but upsetting geoscience 
research. First, under most circumstances such 
research is morally permissible. Secondly, re-
vising this research in response to upset-
induced external interference is morally im-
permissible in the absence of strong counter-
vailing pragmatic reasons and attempts to re-
duce upset. And thirdly, potentially upsetting 
research ought to be communicated truthfully 
and tailored to each individual situation.  
Thinking about the above issues allowed us to 
draw valuable lessons with regard to EE-Con. 
In particular, we entered the next meeting with 
stakeholders with a clear strategy that included 
a plan of communication and a plan about how 
much to comply with potential requests for re-
vision. Following constructive dialogue, the 
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mayor and other representatives of the study 
areas agreed to the project’s resettlement aspect 
after all and our research is well on the	way. 
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